RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE A INVOLUÇÃO UTERINA RETARDADA EM VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 2. INVOLUÇÃO UTERINA RETARDADA -/- A involução uterina retardada é uma desordem reprodutiva parcialmente ocasionada por problemas nutricionais. Terminados os mecanismos do parto, os órgãos genitais da fêmea sofrerá alterações em seu tamanho, peso e forma, eles reduzem de tamanho até sua normalização, esse processo é conhecido como involução uterina (...) (LANDAETA-HERNÁNDEZ, et al. 2004); a sua duração pode variar entre quatro a oito semanas, embora idealmente deva ser atingida aos 30 dias, é mais rápida em vacas de primeiro parto, bem como em vacas que amamentam os seus bezerros e pode ser retardada em vacas que tiveram problemas nutricionais (mal alimentadas ou até desnutridas), partos gêmeos, distorcias e retenção placentária. A recuperação do útero pós-parto ou involução uterina depende de contrações miometriais, eliminação da possível infecção bacteriana e regeneração do endométrio. A regeneração como tal, é denominada involução microscópica e usualmente segue à involução macroscópica ou de redução de peso e tamanho. Esta última pode levar entre 2 a 4 semanas e a primeira, entre 4 a 6 semanas (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996). A eliminação dos loquios e a redução do tamanho uterino são causadas por contrações miometriais, devidas inicialmente à presença de estrogênio durante o parto e posteriormente à secreção sustentada de prostaglandinas após o parto, as quais aumentam o tônus uterino e assim promovem a involução. Quando, de forma anormal, o período de involução se prolonga além dos mecanismos fisiológicos normais, define-se a situação como retardo na involução uterina com riscos potenciais de redução da eficiência reprodutiva, pela maior probabilidade de desenvolvimento de metrite, alteração da ciclicidade pós-parto e posteriores falhas na implantação por falhas na recuperação endometrial. 2.1 Relação energia e proteína O excesso de energia antes do parto pode levar ao retardo na involução uterina por que, a acumulação em excesso de reservas, se faz na forma de tecido adiposo, o qual ao ser mobilizado, durante o periparto, em resposta à busca pelo animal de fontes de energia para a depleção do glicogênio hepático e para a redução do consumo de matéria seca, deve ativar mecanismos gliconeogênicos (ZUÑIGA, 2006). Entre os substratos para a gliconeogênese incluem-se, em primeiro lugar, o tecido adiposo. Um rápido sinal endócrino para sua mobilização provém do cortisol (em excesso durante o parto), mas na presença de grande quantidade de tecido adiposo se apresentará dois efeitos imediatos; o primeiro uma cetose aguda e o segundo a infiltração da gordura do fígado, também chamado fígado graxo. Estas duas situações alteram a homeostase, em especial do tecido uterino (que sob pouca oferta de glicose, já que a mesma está sendo utilizada por outros tecidos que na compartimentalização enérgica prevalecem sobre o tecido reprodutivo), não é abundante, assim, o miométrio não deve ter energia para manter a contractilidade induzida pelas prostaglandinas. Adicionalmente as prostaglandinas são estruturalmente um ácido graxo insaturado composto por 20 átomos de carbono (ácido araquidônico) que necessita da enzima ciclo-oxigenase que dá origem à síntese de compostos intermediários instáveis chamados endoperóxidos cíclicos (PGG e PGH) (BARRERA, 2003), indispensáveis para a formação da prostaglandina e que não podem ser sintetizados por estar alterado o mecanismo lipogênico. Da mesma forma, o fator contrário em relação ao balanço energético preparado, isto é, em casos de deficiência de energia no preparo, leva a involução uterina retarda mediante um mecanismo que finalmente se assemelha ao apresentado em excesso de energia, mas através de um processo fisiológico em alguns pontos diferentes. Dependendo da gravidade do déficit energético, o catabolismo tecidular pode atingir magnitudes exageradas e, se a ele se somam os excessos de amônio formado pelo déficit de energia a nível ruminal, é provável que fenômenos fisiológicos se convertam em patológicos. A rápida perda de condição corporal, afeta o desempenho reprodutivo devido aos efeitos da excessiva taxa de mobilização dos tecidos sobre a saúde do útero e sua motilidade, já que não se encontrará possibilidade de síntese de prostaglandinas por déficit nos precursores lípidos e tampouco haverá glicose disponível como combustível energético, além disso, o atraso na involução uterina está intimamente relacionada com o balanço energético negativo (BEN) e os seus efeitos na concentração de metabolitos que influenciam o balanço hormonal, em especial sobre os estrógenos. Igualmente, no início da lactação o balanço energético negativo é o resultado de uma alta relação entre a hormona do crescimento e a insulina no sangue, que promove a mobilização de ácidos graxos de cadeia longa do tecido adiposo (ZUÑIGA, 2006). O BEN provoca alterações nas concentrações de metabolitos e hormonas como a glicose, a insulina, a hormona do crescimento (GH) (GALVIS, et al. 2003) e o fator insulínico de crescimento tipo 1 (IGF-1)que estão envolvidos no metabolismo energético intermediário e informam do estado nutricional do hipotálamo afetando a secreção de GnRH atrasando, dessa maneira, o tempo de involução uterina. Ações bloqueadoras mediadas por opioides endógenos que freiam a liberação de FSH e dela derivada, ocorre uma menor síntese de estrogênios que ativam receptores específicos no endométrio e não promovem contractilidade endometrial. Para suprir as necessidades das fêmeas quanto a proteínas e energias, os farelos de milho, soja, arroz, algodão, girassol, amendoim, etc., suprem muito bem as quantidades necessárias. Para tanto, faz-se necessário o cálculo correto das quantidades a serem disponibilizadas na ração, bem como ao cálculo da quantidade fornecida no cocho para o animal, uma vez que a ingestão superior de determinados elementos como o molibdênio, a exemplo, podem causar diversos transtornos para além dos reprodutivos. As forrageiras podem suprir as fontes de energia e proteínas das fêmeas, como as leguminosas por exemplo, em especial a leucena, que serve como alternativa alimentar para a alimentação dos animais, porém mesmo com o fornecimento à vontade das forrageiras como os capins, é necessária uma complementação e a ração concentrada é o melhor remédio para tal. 2.2 Minerais Sabe-se que as deficiências de alguns minerais, incluindo o cálcio, fósforo, cobalto, cobre, iodo, manganês e selênio e os excessos de molibdênio afetam diretamente o sistema reprodutivo (MONCADA, 2001). Suas deficiências correm paralelas com alterações do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-ovário. Sendo o cálcio um elemento indispensável na contractilidade do útero, seu déficit na dieta poderia ser responsável por uma involução uterina inadequada (RÚGELES, 2001). O cobalto é necessário no rúmen para a formação da vitamina B12. Quando ocorre uma deficiência de cobalto observa-se, primeiro, uma diminuição no consumo de alimentos e, com isso, uma baixa síntese de glicose, um consumo anormal de minerais (pica ou depravação do gosto) e uma queda na produção. Como consequência, pode-se afetar indiretamente, tanto a quantidade de nutrientes consumidos como seu aproveitamento refletindo-se finalmente sobre a fertilidade em forma negativa (DEHNING, 1988). As exigências nutricionais de cobalto em bovinos de corte ou leite, são escassas a nível de pesquisas, porém pode-se obter através da ingestão de matéria seca (MS) sobre um coeficiente fixo que é 0,1, esse número é o pico do fornecimento de cobalto, uma vez ultrapassado a quantidade de 0,1 mg/kg os animais serão acometidos por altos índices de toxidade, por isso o criador deve estar atento ao fornecimento desse microelemento aos animais. Porém, segundo estudos, o intervalo sugerido em quantidades desse elemento é de 0,07 e 0,11 mg/kg. Alguns cereais podem disponibilizar o cobalto em concentrações ideais, porém é melhor a prevenção, sendo assim, a deficiência de cobalto pode ser prevenida ou tratada mediante a adição de sais de cobalto às misturas minerais ingredientes da ração fornecida aos animais, ou pode-se optar pela injeção da vitamina B12 diretamente no animal. Da mesma forma que a deficiência de cálcio e fósforo, na deficiência de cobre, é observado um aumento da involução uterina retardada, calores silenciosos e ciclos estrais irregulares, uma vez que as funções deste mineral estão associadas às enzimas relacionadas com o citocromo C oxidase, transporte de albumina e ceruloplasmina, esta última de vital importância como principal oxidadora de ferro e ativadora nos processos de regulação dos mecanismos antioxidantes a nível celular. Não deve-se esquecer a estreita relação entre cobre e molibdênio. Excessos de molibdênio inibem a absorção de cobre. Em animais criados à pasto, deve-se estar atento a áreas onde as concentrações de molibdênio são mais presentes, se houver grande quantidade desse elemento nas forrageiras que o animal consumir, a melhor maneira de suplementação do cobre nesses animais é a injeção periódica de compostos a base de cobre, que evitarão a complexação do trato gastrointestinal. Os bovinos requerem 8,0 mg/kg (4 – 10 mg/kg) de cobre na dieta para corte e de 10,0 mg/kg (9 – 11 mg/kg) na dieta para bovinos leiteiros. Além da opção de ração que contenha esses níveis de cobre, o criador pode optar pelas forragens, que possuem quantidades variadas de cobre dependendo da disponibilidade do mesmo no solo, e que as leguminosas apresentam os melhores valores para que os animais possam consumir as quantidades essenciais para que não haja nem cobre demais nem cobre de menos no organismo, e que evite-se, com isso a involução uterina ou quaisquer outra doença reprodutiva ou não. A deficiência de iodo induzida pelo consumo de forragens com níveis inferiores a 2 mg/kg de Matéria Seca (MS) ou baixa suplementação mineral, induz a retenção de membranas fetais e involuções uterinas retardadas. A tiroxina (T4) e a triiodotironina (T3) estimulam a produção de ATP mitocondrial, o que, por sua vez, estimula a captação celular de oxigênio e aumenta o metabolismo energético. Em casos de deficiência de iodo, as tiroxinas não poderão ser sintetizadas (RÚGELES, 2001). -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BARRERA, R. Las prostaglandinas: Estrategia Farmacológica. Portal Veterinária. Disponível em:-. Acesso em: março de 2020. BERCHIELLI, Telma Teresinha; PIRES, Alexandre Vaz; OLIVEIRA, SG de. Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: funep, 2006. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Reprodução Animal: Fisiologia do Parto e da Lactação Animal. Disponível em:-. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GALVIS GÓEZ, Rubén Darío; CORREA CARDONA, Héctor J. Interacciones entre el metabolismo y la reproducción en la vaca lechera: es la actividad gluconeogénica el eslabón perdido?. Rev. Col. Cienc. Pec. Vol. 15:Pág.1-15. 2002. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. LANDAETA-HERNÁNDEZ, A. J. et al. Effect of biostimulation on uterine involution, early ovarian activity and first postpartum estrous cycle in beef cows. Theriogenology, v. 61, n. 7-8, p. 1521-1532, 2004. MONCADA, A. H. Implicaciones metabólicas en el aborto bovino. Seminario de Nutrición, Reproducción y Clínica de Bovinos. Universidad de Antioquia, Medellin. 2001. MORAES, S. da S. Principais deficiências minerais em bovinos de corte. Campo Grande, MS: Embrapa Gado de Corte, 2001., 2001. RÚGELES, Clara. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad en bovinos. Revista MVZ Córdoba, p. 24-30, 2001. ZUÑIGA, F. D. Prevención de desordenes metabólicos en la etapa pre y pos parto en bovinos de leche. Engormix. Disponível em:-. Acesso em: março de 2020. (shrink)

In this chapter, we will summarize recent empirical results highlighting how different groups of people solve pure coordination games. Such games are traditionally studied in behavioural economics, where two people need to coordinate without communicating with each other. Our results suggest that coordination choices vary across groups of people, and that people can adapt flexibly to these differences in order to coordinate between groups. We propose that pure coordination games are a useful empirical platform for studying aspects of mindshaping. Drawing (...) on existing psychological literature on alignment during interactions, we suggest that experience of successful interaction leads people to develop aligned intuitions about what is relevant and appropriate that support coordination when interaction and communication is not possible. Consistent with arguments made in the literature on mindshaping we believe that such alignment is more important for coordination than mindreading inferences about mental states, and indeed that mindreading is instead a form of coordination behaviour that is dependent upon intuitive alignment. (shrink)

Recent epistemology has witnessed a substantial opposition between two competing approaches to capturing the notion of non-accidentality in the analysis of knowledge: the explanationist and the modalist. According to the latest advocates of the former, S knows that p if and only if S believes that p because p is true. According to champions of the latter, S knows that p if and only if S's belief that p is true in a relevant set of possible worlds. Because Bogardus and (...) Perrin's explanationism promises to deliver a plausible analysis of knowledge without any need for modal notions, it is an elegant proposal with prima facie appeal. However, such version of explanationism ultimately does not live up to its promises: in this paper, I raise some objections to their explanationist analysis of knowledge while showing that modalism is in much better shape than they think. In particular, I argue that their explanationist condition generates the wrong results in Gettier cases and fake-barn cases. I also offer and defend a novel version of modalism: I introduce a refined safety condition which is shown to successfully handle the same Gettier cases that beset Bogardus and Perrin's version of explanationism. The paper concludes with a reassessment of the explanationist's initial ambition to provide an analysis of knowledge without modal notions. The upshot will be that even if the prospects for such analysis remain dim, our money should be on the modalist, not the explanationist. (shrink)

Aunque el populismo es uno de los conceptos políticos más empleados en nuestra época, suele decirse que también es uno de los más escasamente comprendidos (Taggart 2002, 62), y hay incluso quien cree que está rodeado de un “completo caos conceptual” (Müller 2016, 11). También hay quien ha intentado clasificar diferentes aproximaciones al populismo (véase especialmente Taggart 2000, 10-22; también Panizza 2005, 2-3; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 186-96; Weyland 2017, 51-55). Sin embargo, lo cierto es que el principal consenso académico sobre (...) el populismo es, precisamente, que no hay ningún gran consenso sobre lo que pueda ser el populismo. Por eso hay quien dice que el populismo es un ejemplo paradigmático de lo que Gallie (1955) denominó “conceptos esencialmente controvertidos” (Weyland 2001; Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; 2017). -/- Semejantes dificultades para acordar una definición permiten explicar por qué prácticamente cualquier texto académico sobre el populismo empieza advirtiendo que en este debate hay que andar con pies de plomo. Así las cosas, esta entrada no aspira a ofrecer ninguna definición concluyente del populismo (para intentos de ese tipo, véase Mansbridge y Macedo 2019 o Urbinati 2019b). Cada sección tiene una aspiración más modesta. La primera identifica algunas dificultades que complican la comprensión y definición del populismo. La segunda sección presenta dos rasgos en los que, a pesar de las discrepancias, la mayoría de las definiciones del populismo coinciden. La tercera ofrece una reconstrucción sintética de la teoría populista desarrollada por Laclau y Mouffe –dos de los teóricos más influyentes tanto política como académicamente. (shrink)

The idea that citizens have a right to receive information that is relevant for their suitable exercise of political rights and liberties is well established in democratic societies. However, this right has never been systematically analyzed, thus remaining a blurry concept. This article tackles this conceptual gap by conceptualizing citizens’ right to information. After reviewing previous approaches to this idea, I locate citizens’ right to information on the map of communication rights, and put forward a systematic framework for both justifying (...) and analyzing it. This framework focuses on this right’s grounds, its function, its holders, its content, and its correlative duties. Although the conceptualization offered here will be incomplete, it will be enough to distinguish the general concept of citizens’ right to information from both its specific conceptions and from the other two best-known rights of the public: freedom of information and the public’s right to know. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the topic of explanation. The insights of Plato, Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Carl Hempel are examined, and are used to argue against the view that explanation is merely a problem for the philosophy of science. Having established its importance for understanding knowledge in general, the book concludes with a bold and original explanation of explanation.

Book synopsis: This collection of previously unpublished essays presents the newest developments in the thought of international scholars working on the explanation of action. The contributions focus on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interprative explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons. Challenging numerous current orthodoxies, and offering positive suggestions from a variety of different perspectives, this book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the explanation of action.

A careful elaboration and defence of holism in the philosophy of the social sciences, with regard both to particulars and properties. The last chapter addresses the issue of the irreducibility of holistic explanation in the social sciences.

Recent experimental epistemology has devoted increasing attention to folk attributions of epistemic justification. Empirical studies have tested whether lay people ascribe epistemic justification in specific lottery-style vignettes (Friedman and Turri 2014, Turri and Friedman 2015, Ebert et al. 2018) and also to more ordinary beliefs (Nolte et al. 2021). In this paper, I highlight three crucial but hitherto uncritically accepted assumptions of these studies, and I argue that they are untenable. Central to my criticism is the observation that epistemic justification (...) is a philosophical term of art mostly foreign to lay people: as such, it is not suitable for direct empirical testing without being previously introduced. This point reveals a folk conceptual gap between the subject matter of these experimental studies and the conceptual repertoire we can reasonably expect lay people to possess. I elaborate on this worry, and I end on a cautiously optimistic note: after suggesting better strategies to survey folk attributions of epistemic justification, I conclude that the challenge raised by the folk conceptual gap remains difficult but can in principle be addressed. (shrink)

What constitutes numerically one and the same tradition diachronically, at different times? This question is the focus of often violent dispute in societies. Is it capable of a rational resolution? Many accounts attempt that resolution with a diagnosis of ambiguity of the disputed concept-Islam, Marxism, or democracy for example. The diagnosis offered is in terms of vagueness, namely the vague criteria for sameness or similarity of central beliefs and practices.

A discussion of three central ideas in action theory; trying to act, doing or acting, one's action causing further consequences.

Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.

In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands such scrutiny.

In virtue of what are later and an earlier group members of one and the numerically same tradition? Gallie was one of the few philosophers to have engaged with issues surrounding this question. My article is not a faithful exegesis of Gallie but develops a terminology in which to discuss issues surrounding the numerical identity of a tradition over time, based on some of his insights.

Argument that Marx has a realist ontology and a correspondence theory of truth. His views are compared to both Hegel's and Kant's. This interpretation departs from more Hegelian, 'idealist' interpretations that often rely on misunderstanding some of the work of the early Marx. There is also a discussion and partial defence of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

This paper argues that Spinoza held substances other than God to be inconceivable. It uses this claim to develop a novel response to the Problem of Other Substances, the problem of explaining why some of Spinoza’s proofs for God’s existence cannot be used to prove the existence of a non-divine substance instead.

RESUMEN: En este trabajo defiendo que el ideal de una ciudadanía competente es viable incluso en los contextos adversos que ofrecen las sociedades digitales. Para ello, identifico cinco problemas que obstaculizan a la ciudadanía la adquisición de competencia política: el pluralismo, el problema del moderador, la dificultad para acceder a información relevante, la apatía política y los sesgos políticos. Aunque estos problemas se agudizan en las democracias digitales, muestro que existen mecanismos institucionales que permiten corregir y mitigar sus efectos perjudiciales (...) sobre la competencia política. Por ello, concluyo, el ideal de ciudadanía competente es prima facie factible y podría lograrse mediante la implementación de medidas institucionales que fomenten la adquisición de competencia política por parte de la ciudadanía. -/- ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that the ideal of a competent citizenry is feasible even in the adverse context digital societies offer. To do so, I identify five problems that hinder citizens’ acquisition of political competence: pluralism, the chairman problem, difficulties in finding relevant information, political apathy, and political biases. Even though these problems worsen in digital democracies, I show that there are institutional mechanisms that allow for the correction and mitigation of the detrimental effects they might have on political competence. I thus conclude that the ideal of a competent citizenry is prima facie feasible and could be achieved through the implementation of institutional measures that foster political competence among citizens. (shrink)

A comparison of disjunctive theories of action and perception. The development of a theory of action that warrants the name, a disjunctive theory. On this theory, there is an exclusive disjunction: either an action or an event (in one sense). It follows that in that sense basic actions do not have events intrinsic to them.

Spinoza’s epistemology aims at the development of ‘adequate’ and the removal of ‘confused’ ideas. His theory of confusion raises many questions, however. It has often been thought that the confusion of an idea is mind-relative, such that an idea might be confused in my mind but adequate in God’s. In this paper I argue that confusion cannot be mind-relative, because an idea’s confusion is determined by what it represents and for Spinoza, ideas are individuated by their representational content. Instead, I (...) propose that although it is possible to consider one and the same idea both adequately and confusedly, what such acts of considering pick up on are mind-independent features of ideas. (shrink)

Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...) said to be identical with the physical action. -/- After carefully stating the second, world-side view, I produce two arguments against it. The first relies on the fact that if a=b and b=c, then a=c, sometimes put colloquially as: if something is identical to two things, then the two things must be identical to one another. In the case of trying, one might try to do something by performing a plurality of simultaneous actions, a sure sign that the relation between the trying and the plurality of actions by which one tries must be some relation other than identity. -/- The second argument discusses two cases, recorded in William James’ The Principles of Psychology, of a patient who tries but who performs no action whatever. This is sometimes called ‘naked trying’. A recent attempt at denying that there can be such cases of naked trying is examined and dismissed. (shrink)

My essay aims to demonstrate that Neoliberalism exercises its art of government on forms of life turning their potentiality into adaptability. According with one of most influential reference thinker of Neoliberalism, Friedrich von Hayek, the spontaneous order of the market requests the constant adaptation of individuals to circumstances of which no one can be aware and can master. However, such adaptability – that could come from a certain negative philosophical anthropology – is the reverse side of the same potentiality theorized (...) by authors of Italian Thought like Agamben, Esposito and exponents of Post-Operaism. The paper aims to focus the condition for which such conversion of potentiality into adaptability is prevented. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop and motivate a novel formulation of the safety condition in terms of etiological proper function. After testing this condition against the most pressing objections to safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge in the literature, my conclusion will be the following: once safety is suitably understood in terms of etiological proper function, it stands a better chance as the right anti-Gettier condition on knowledge.

The article argues that the famous debate on natural and positive law between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart rests on a dispute about whether or not that something is a law provides on its own a prima facie reason for doing something.

Whether some condition is equivalent to a conjunction of some conditions has been a major issue in analytic philosophy. Examples include: knowledge, acting freely, causation, and justice. Philosophers have striven to offer analyses of these, and other concepts, by showing them equivalent to such a conjunction. Timothy Williamson offers a number of arguments for the idea that knowledge is ‘prime’, hence not equivalent to or composed by some such conjunction. I focus on one of his arguments: the requirement that such (...) conjuncts must be freely recombinable. Although there has been a great deal of discussion of Williamson's arguments, the flaw I describe has gone unnoticed. Williamson's argument is expressed in terms of conditions, and cases of the condition. Does the condition include specific information, or is the specific information only part of the case? His argument equivocates between more and less general specifications of the conditions. Once this distinction is clarified, his argument can be seen to be vitiated by this conflation. Neither option yields a sound argument for Williamson's desired conclusion. (shrink)

There appear to be multifunctional artefacts of a type such that none of their functions can be attributed only to some proper part of the artefact. I use two examples of allegedly multifunctional artefacts of this kind in what follows, one due to Lynne Rudder Baker (aspirin) and another of my own (a spork). The two examples are meant to make the same point. I discuss her aspirin example, since its discussion has entered the literature, but without its being dealt (...) with satisfactorily. My example is, I believe, more intuitive than that of aspirin, which Baker introduced in her response to a challenge to her views, and so I will mostly rely on my example of a spork, especially at the end of the paper, to make my case. -/- I argue that in at least those two cases, if the standard arguments for distinguishing between an object and what constitutes it are sound, an argument showing that what we might have taken to be a single multifunctional object is in fact a case of multiple single-function artefacts which collocate. Or almost. There is one further assumption needed for these cases, beyond what the constitution cases require, and I produce reasons for accepting that assumption. (shrink)

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are two representatives of German Idealism, both of whom developed impressing category systems. At the core of both systems is the question of the relation of the Absolute to its determinations and the determinations of finite beings. Both idealists try to deduce their respective category systems from the immediacy of the Absolute. Both use combinatorial methods to get from known to new categories or constellations in the system, which then unfold in (...) the world. Krause is thereby considered the eponym of so-called panentheism, the doctrine that “Everything is in God.” Hegel is also often referred to as a panentheist. Through a comparison of the two systems of categories, in this essay the thesis will be advocated that Hegel was in no sense a panentheist. Krause is and remains the gold standard of panentheism. (shrink)

John Searle sets out five statements, the relation of each to its successor being one of entailment.

Some problems in John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality. I express some doubts about his constitutive v. regulative rule distinction, and press some objections against his unanalysed idea of acceptance or agreement.

In this article I try to shed some light on the complex relation between democracy, political knowledge, and disinformation. To do so, I first define three related concepts which, once clarified, could facilitate our understanding of the problems digital democracies face. First, drawing from the general notion of competence, I define civic competence. Then, drawing from the general notion of knowledge, I define political knowledge. Finally, and drawing from the general notion of information, I define democratically relevant information. After clarifying (...) these concepts, I will present three epistemic positions, to which I will refer to as knowledge, ignorance, and mistake. These three epistemic positions will be further connected with informative phenomena such as disinformation, fake news, and misinformation. (shrink)

This article explores how readers recognize their personal identities represented through data visualizations. The recognition is investigated starting from three definitions captured by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur: the identification with the visualization, the recognition of someone in the visualization, and the mutual recognition that happens between readers. Whereas these notions were initially applied to study the role of the book reader, two further concepts complete the shift to data visualization: the digital identity stays for the present-day passport of human actions (...) and the promise is the intimate reflection that projects readers towards their own future. This article reflects on the delicate meaning of digital identity and the way of representing it according to this structure: From Personal Identity to Media is a historical introduction to self-recognition, Data Visualization for Representing Identities moves the focus to visual representation, and The Course of Recognition breaks the self-recognition in through the five concepts above just before the Conclusion. (shrink)

What might it mean to say that there is such a thing as a hermeneutic circle in the social sciences? A consideration of some remarks by Charles Taylor and others and an interpretive reconstruction, and assessment, of the idea of such a circle.

This dissertation is a contribution to the field of empirically informed metaethics, which combines the rigorous conceptual clarity of traditional metaethics with a careful review of empirical evidence. More specifically, this work stands at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and philosophy of action. The study comprises six chapters on three distinct (although related) topics. Each chapter is structured as an independent paper and addresses a specific open question in the literature. The first part concerns the psychological features and (...) cognitive function of moral intuition. Chapter 1 (“Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition”) is focused on the concept of intuitive strength, which is one of the defining features of moral intuition. I provide a metacognitive account of intuitive strength and show why such a view is preferable to emotional or quasi-perceptual accounts. Then, in Chapter 2 (“Dual process reflective equilibrium”), I will discuss the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning. I will contend that the influential “default-interventionist” model of reasoning, theorized by Greene, is insufficiently supported by the evidence. In light of some recent studies, I outline an account of moral reasoning in which intuition and reflection are not in conflict but cooperate to reach a reflective goal. I call this model dual process reflective equilibrium. The aim of the first part is descriptive, i.e., it argues for an accurate understanding of moral intuition and reasoning in light of the available empirical evidence. In contrast, the second part addresses a normative question: is a subject epistemically justified in forming a belief on the basis of a moral intuition? Skeptics of moral intuition argue that accepting moral intuitions should be the exception rather than the rule to the extent that epistemically defective processes determine the content of moral intuitions. Chapter 3 (“Moral intuitionism and the reliability challenge”) introduces the recent empirical challenges to the reliability of moral intuitions and elaborates a promising strategy for defending intuitionism. In short, I consider whether subjects can track the reliability of their intuitions with their confidence. In Chapter 4 (“The argument from limited cognitive resources”), I evaluate a different strategy to defend moral intuitionism. Specifically, I develop an argument according to which accepting moral intuitions is legitimate because it is the most rational option that a subject has, given her limited resources. The third and final part of the dissertation concerns the role of moral intuitions in action. The influence of automatic processes on moral conduct raises different challenges to moral philosophy. The first challenge is to explain how a subject can be motivated by certain values without the mental effort of deliberation. Chapter 5 (“Caring, moral motivation, and automatic conduct”) tackles this issue. Chapter 6 (“Moral sensitivity as skillful automaticity”) aims to explain how moral agents can be sensitive to good reasons through automatic mental processes. (shrink)

Mind-body parallelism is the view that mind and body stand in the same “order and connection,” as Spinoza put it, or that corresponding mental and physical states have corresponding causal explanations in terms of other mental and physical states. This dissertation investigates the nature and role of mind-body parallelism, as well as other forms of parallelism, in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, it also considers how Spinoza’s views relate to current discussions. In present-day philosophy of mind, mind-body parallelism (...) is almost never defended. It is seen as a historical dead-end with insurmountable problems. By contrast, I argue that parallelism powerfully responds to the post-Cartesian mind-body problem (which remains with us today) and that it points a way forward in current debates. The dissertation contains five independent chapters. After an introduction that situates parallelism in relation to both Spinoza’s time and to present discussions, Chapter 1 presents an argument for parallelism aimed at a present-day audience. Chapter 2 discusses Spinoza’s own arguments for parallelism. Both chapters help to clarify what parallelism is, in part by distinguishing between several versions of the view. Chapter 3 discusses what is often considered parallelism’s most problematic feature, its rejection of mind-body interaction. I argue that by distinguishing between the post-Cartesian context in which Spinoza wrote and present-day discussions, we can see that parallelism is compatible with mental causation. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, discuss specific ways in which parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s view of the mind. In Chapter 4, I argue that parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s interesting and distinctive positions on the nature of agency and motivation. In Chapter 5, I show the role of parallelism in his representationalist theory of consciousness. A guiding thread throughout the dissertation is that parallelism presents a distinctive and interesting way to combine realism, non-reductionism and naturalism in relation to those features of human self-understanding that seem difficult to fit into a naturalistic worldview. (shrink)

The Ethical Dimension of Science According to Mariano Artigas: Many authors have written, from different approaches, about the relationships between ethics and science. In this work, we analyze how Mariano Artigas did it. He gives great importance to ethics, which he considers a philosophical presupposition of scientific activity. A detailed analysis of his work allows to understand to what extent ethics is important for science. Specifically, we consider the relationships of ethics with humans and with science; the interweaving and the (...) distinction between both of them; the importance of ethics as a hermeneutical key in Popper; and the emergence of ethics before, during, and after scientific activity. (shrink)

Roger Penrose is known for his proposals, in collaboration with Stuart Hameroff, for quantum action in the brain. These proposals, which are still recent, have a prior, less known basis, which will be studied in the following work. First, the paper situates the framework from which a mathematical physicist like Penrose proposes to speak about consciousness. Then it shows how he understands the possible relationships between computation and consciousness and what criticism from other authors he endorses, to conclude by explaining (...) how he understands this relationship between consciousness and computation. Then, it focuses on the concept of non-locality so essential to his understanding of consciousness. With some examples, such as impossible objects or aperiodic tiling, the study addresses the concept of non-locality as Penrose understands it, and then shows how far he intends to arrive with that concept of non-locality. At all times the approach will be more philosophical than physical. (shrink)

The scope of public reason determines which political decisions should be taken according to its standards. In this paper, I defend a broad-scope view of public reason, according to which every single political decision should be justified by public reasons. In the first part, I argue that, despite the unclarity of Rawls’ position, it is compatible with the wide-scope view. In the three following parts, I refute the main arguments in favour of the narrow-scope view of public reason. Finally, I (...) offer an argument for the wide-scope view and conclude that it is preferable from the point of view of political liberalism. (shrink)

This open access book revises Kant’s ethical thought in one of its most notorious respects: its exclusion of animals from moral consideration. The book gives readers in animal ethics an accessible introduction to Kant’s views on our duties to others, and his view that we have only ‘indirect’ duties regarding animals. It then investigates how one would have to depart from Kant in order to recognise that animals matter morally for their own sake. Particular attention is paid to Kant’s ‘Formula (...) of Humanity,' the role of autonomy and the moral law, as well as Kant’s notions of practical reason and animal instinct. The result is a deliberately amended version of Kantianism which nevertheless remains faithful to central aspects of Kant’s thought. The book’s final part illustrates the framework’s use in applied contexts, addressing the issues of using animals as mere means, the ethics of veganism and vegetarianism, and environmental protection. Nico Dario Müller shows how, when furnished with duties to animals, Kant's moral philosophy can be a powerful resource for animal ethicists. (shrink)

If reduction of the social to the physical fail, what options remain for understanding their relationship? Two such options are supervenience and constructivism. Both are vitiated by a similar fault. So the choices are limited: reduction after all, or emergence.

I defend the view, hardly original with me, that there is no evidence, deductive or non-deductive, for any of our causal beliefs, that does not already assume that there are some causal connections, and hence that there is no way in which experience on its own, or with causalität-free principles, can support the structure of out causal knowledge. The deductive case is perhaps obvious. In the case of non-deductive arguments, I consider how experience of constant conjunctions, together with the employment (...) of an inference to the best explanation, might lead to a causal conclusion. But I argue that such an inference would need as a premiss that the causal explanation of the constant conjunction is the best explanation of that evidence, and ‘best’ in this context requires the thought that the causal hypothesis best fits with our existing causal beliefs. (shrink)

The following abstracts were selected by AJOB-Neuroscience judges as the best submitted to the International Neuroethics Society 2024 Annual Meeting based on merit, novelty, relevance, and contribution to the field of neuroethics. The scores were tallied and the top abstracts appear in alphabetical order by first author surname.

Building on her previous work (2004, 2012, 2013), Christine Korsgaard’s recent book Fellow Creatures (2018) has provided the most highly developed Kantian account of duties towards animals. I raise two issues with the results of this account. First, the duties that Korsgaard accounts for are duties “towards” animals in name only. Since Korsgaard does not reject the Kantian conception in which direct duties towards others require mutual moral constraint, what she calls duties “towards” animals are merely Kantian duties regarding animals, (...) verbally repackaged. Hence, Korsgaard’s account is best understood as an expansion (albeit a substantial one) of Kant’s own view of an indirect duty regarding animals. Second, the expansion does not take us quite as far as Korsgaard hopes. She aims for a conception in which our duties towards animals and humans are equally important, but her argument does not support this conclusion. I point out the potential for a more radical revision of Kant’s anthropocentrism that rejects his underlying assumption that duties towards others are based on mutual constraint. (shrink)

Animal ethics has often been criticized for an overreliance on “ideal” or even “utopian” theorizing. In this article, I recognize this problem, but argue that the “nonideal theory” which critics have offered in response is still insufficient to make animal ethics action-guiding. I argue that in order for animal ethics to be action-guiding, it must consider agent-centered theories of change detailing how an ideally just human-animal coexistence can and should be brought about. I lay out desiderata that such a theory (...) of change should suffice so as to be helpful in guiding action. Specifically, a theory of change should determine (1) who needs to do what in order for ideal justice to be achieved in the long run, (2) who should be expected to refuse compliance and how they should be moved to comply, and (3) why specific intermediate steps are necessary. I show how previous “nonideal” contributions, though helpful in other ways, are insufficiently determinate on these points and I sketch a (still somewhat utopian) theory of change for one specific context. This brings animal ethics a crucial step closer to being action-guiding in the real world. (shrink)

Most of the existing studies on Bourdieu and the digital regards the social and class distinctions in the use of digital technologies, thus presupposing a certain transparency of technologies themselves. Our proposal is to refer to this attitude as “Bourdieu outside the digital.” Yet in this paper, another perspective called “Bourdieu inside the digital” is developed, which moves the focus on the effects of some emerging technologies on social distinctions and discrimination. The main hypothesis is that algorithms of machine learning (...) are producers and reproducers of habitus. Although their results present a greater granularity with respect to the standard techniques of the past, these algorithms still reduce individuals to categories, general trends, classes, and behaviors. Such a reduction has flattening effects on the individuals’ self-understanding, especially in terms of identity and interaction with the social world. This is the phenomenon described in the article as the “personalization without personality,” whose consequences are both existential and social-political. This idea will be illustrated through qualitative and comparative analysis between the correspondence analysis and the multiple correspondence analysis used by Bourdieu in his works and some of those techniques that are performed today in big data analytics. (shrink)